Tuesday, November 13, 2012 

Yet another post on Abu Qatada.

Well, who could have predicted thatAbu Qatada winning his latest appeal against deportation to Jordan?  This has never happened before!  Oh, except it hasTwice, in fact.  And when even a keyboard monkey like me with no real legal knowledge whatsoever could pick holes in Theresa May's trumping of how this time Qatada really was as good as on a plane, it suggests both she and her predecessors have been receiving incredibly bad advice for quite some time.

The judgment by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (PDF) is essentially a rehash of the ECHR's decision earlier in the year, that Qatada doesn't personally face the prospect of mistreatment or torture, but he does face the prospect of a trial where the main evidence against him is confessions from men who almost certainly were tortured.  Regardless of the change to the Jordanian constitution to explicitly prohibit the use of evidence obtained via torture, Mr Justice Mitting and his team reached the conclusion that, based on expert evidence from Jordanians who gave written and in person testimony, the statements that incriminate Qatada may well be used against him, and that the burden of proof is likely to fall on the witnesses to prove they were tortured, rather than for the prosecution to prove that they weren't.  As the torture happened over a decade ago and the Jordanian courts previously rejected the notion that torture took place, the likelihood of them being able to do so, even in front of three civilian court judges, is dubious in the extreme.  Barring a further change to the Jordanian code of criminal procedure or a definitive ruling from one of two courts on the ambiguities in the code, Qatada is staying here.

Unless that is May manages to convince the Court of Appeal that SIAC is being unreasonable in its demands of the Jordanians, something that seems highly unlikely considering SIAC has come to effectively the same conclusion as the ECHR did.  In the meantime, ol' bird nest face is free for 8 hours a day, if your definition of free is being tagged, followed by security officers the moment you step out of your front door and being denied access to pretty much everything that makes life pleasurable.

If all this seems a bit much for someone whose motivations have often seemed opaque, then SIAC also obtained new information on the nature of the evidence against Qatada.  To say some of it is thin is an understatement: all that links Qatada to the "Reform and Challenge" case is that one of the defendants says he suggested the targets and then congratulated him afterwards; in addition, three of the defendants had copies of a book by Qatada.

The evidence against him for the Millennium plot isn't much thicker: Qatada gave one of the defendants money, although not ostensibly towards the plot, gifting him 800 Jordanian dinars with which he bought a computer, while the defendant admitted discussing the "issue of jihad" with Qatada, although not specifically about any plot.  Another defendant claimed Qatada had given a further $5,000 to the same man, while the money he had been promised to marry the first defendant's sister never arrived.  Otherwise, the evidence again amounts to possession of books by Qatada, and the discovery of messages between the two men.  SIAC additionally comments on this that "[T]he record of the evidence produced at the trial does not clearly support the prosecutor’s case", although it's presumed that in the case file there will be statements from investigators that will.

All is likely to depend on whether the Jordanians are prepared to move further, or whether a case comes before either court that irons out the disagreement between the experts consulted by the commission.  SIAC accepted that the Jordanians had moved significantly from their initial position, and also noted their awareness of how this was a potential opportunity for them to show they were capable of trying a man notorious internationally with scrupulous fairness.  If SIAC was making its decision on that basis alone, as indeed had the ECHR, Qatada would be long gone.

In a different world, this entire case might be seen as showing the best of the British state.  Despite the contempt often shown towards the Human Rights Act and the ECHR by politicians from both main parties, successive governments have abided by the decisions made in line with it, refusing to countenance ignoring the rule of law in this specific case, and have gone so far as to push Jordan towards making genuine judicial reforms.  Pushing any authoritarian state in the direction of respecting basic human rights is something to be proud of, regardless of the circumstances.

Unfortunately, we're stuck with this world, and it's one where judges are traduced by tabloid newspapers for doing their job.  By all means criticise the judiciary if they get basic decisions wrong, or apply the wrong tests when they sentence someone, but not when they've delivered a judgment as in-depth and cogently argued as Mitting has.  


The real responsibility for this 7-year-long slog lies with the last government.  The decision to simply get rid of Qatada rather than attempt to prosecute him has never been explained adequately: we don't know whether there simply isn't enough evidence against him, whether the evidence is mainly phone intercepts, whether his involvement with MI5 goes too deep, whether it was made impossible by the rendering of Bisher al-Rawi who reported on Qatada to MI5, or whether deportation was felt to be the easiest option.  Where this government has failed has been to fall into the same trap as the previous one, of boasting to the media that the deportation is all but done and dusted, only to find it still hasn't got its legal arguments in order.

One suspects that Qatada will eventually get sent to Jordan, if only down to how successive governments have backed themselves into a corner.  Should further changes to the Jordanian law not be forthcoming, then Qatada's bail restrictions will have to be either loosened or dropped entirely.  The only other option is to impose a TPIM, and they can only last for two years.  Even at this late stage there's still time for a potential prosecution to be looked at, however embarrassing that might be either for the previous government or the security services.  It can't be any worse than the prospect of someone built up to be Osama bin Laden's right-hand man in Europe mooching free around London.

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Monday, August 20, 2012 

The continuing triumph of the securocrats.

I recall that, many aeons ago, good ol' Nicholas Clegg asked for ideas on what could be included in a freedom bill. The end result, the Protection of Freedoms Act, is it must be said one of the coalition's very few decent achievements. The amount of time "terrorist suspects" can be detained prior to charge is now 14 days rather than the 28, just a slight reduction on the 90 Tony Blair tried to ram through parliament, the section 44 "anti-terrorist" power the police had that allowed them to search anyone they felt like has gone, as has the biometric data of more than 1m of those arrested but not charged with any offence by the police, although how certain we can be of the destruction of the information is another matter.

We are though still completely in the thrall of securocrats, as a quick glance at the Graun today records. As though the vast majority of the security checks at airports weren't pointless enough, the coalition looks to be resurrecting an old Labour proposal to install similar scanning technology at railway and tube stations. They quite obviously won't be put in place everywhere, and so won't stop those determined to cause carnage who'll be able to enter the system at quieter points, but they will no doubt cause misery at the major terminals. Still, can't be too careful, can you?

The government certainly can't, at least not with intelligence provided by other governments. Not content with ensuring that there will never be a repeat of the release of the seven paragraphs, a memo on Binyam Mohamed which showed we knew the Americans had been involved in "rendering" detainees to foreign climes where they were to be tortured despite our repeated denials, information that we failed to act upon when those detained included British residents, we now learn that the very application for a closed material procedure can also be kept secret if necessary, to of course, "protect national security". In other words, it seems likely that every such order will be kept secret, as by its very nature intelligence involves national security.

If you believe the Ministry of Justice (snigger), this will in fact make it more likely that such claims will go to trial rather than result in settlements, just that we won't be able to know of the documentation that was involved. Which just ever so slightly misses the point, as it's that documentation that established the truth in the first place, and which shows the depths to which our security services are on occasion prepared to plunge. With the cancellation of the Gibson inquiry, and no replacement on the horizon, the desperate need to learn the lessons of our complicity in torture during the first phase of the war on terror seems to have been forgotten.

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Tuesday, April 17, 2012 

Abu Qatata, finally?

Credit where credit is due then: the government could have taken the advice of the head bangers on the Tory backbenchers (and head banger is the only way you can possibly describe Peter Bone, whose surname seems to be lacking something) or followed the wonderful example set (allegedly) by the French and Italians, and just stuck your friend and mine Abu Qatada on a plane to Jordan (the country, not the model, although they could perhaps be the ultimate odd couple in a sitcom: she's had more surgery than Michael Jackson and Joan Rivers combined; he's never had a shave).

Instead, if we're to believe Theresa May, our need to deport an unwanted extremist has struck a blow for human rights in general in the country. In practice, this doesn't look quite so clear cut. The European Court of Human Rights ruled Qatada couldn't be deported in the main because the evidence of his co-defendants, which would make up the majority of the case against him, was obtained as a result of torture. May states that as they have since been pardoned, and that whatever they say will no effect upon those pardons, "we can therefore have confidence that they would give truthful testimony". This is dubious in the extreme. Their pardons might not be affected, but this hardly means that an authoritarian state can't put pressure on them in other ways.

May also seems to contradict herself. She said in her statement that Qatada will be able to challenge the original statements made against him, then states "[I]ndeed, one of the more significant recent developments is the change to the Jordanian constitution last autumn that includes an explicit ban on the use of torture evidence". Presumably if there's an explicit ban on the use of torture evidence then Qatada won't need to challenge the original statements as they won't be admissible? And in any case, there are plenty of vile regimes that in their constitutions have explicit restrictions on certain practices that they nonetheless indulge in. As nit-picking as this might look, these are exactly the sort of doubts that should Qatada appeal again to the ECHR will have to be addressed and answered.

On the whole though it's difficult not to applaud. As there seems to be no chance whatsoever that the government will reconsider and instead decide now that Qatada should be prosecuted here, especially after it's gone to all this effort to persuade the Jordanians to in turn persuade the ECHR that they can be trusted to try him fairly, this is undoubtedly the second best option. It not only shows, as pointed out previously by Maajid Nawaz, that we will not succumb to the very thing that the government's counter-extremism strategy defines as being unacceptable, the undermining of the rule of law, it also indicates that when really pushed we can work with countries such as Jordan to help them improve their systems of government without then in turn selling them weapons as a reward. It does mean that it's doubtful we'll ever learn exactly how intertwined Qatada was with the security services, and there's plenty of reasons why we shouldn't believe that MI5 only had contact with him three or so times prior to 9/11, but if it means we are rid of one of the main reasons for why the tabloids so loathe the ECHR and in turn the Human Rights Act, although there are plenty of others, then it'll at least somewhat make up for it.

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Tuesday, February 07, 2012 

Abu Qatada: same shit, different month.

One of the problems of doing much the same thing creatively over a long period is that you can fall into the trap of repeating yourself to the point where it not only turns off those who previously paid something approaching attention, it also leaves you thoroughly dispirited with how you can't seem to get out of the same old routine. While this is obviously not a problem for Liam Gallagher, and with slight modification seeming repetition can in fact launch an institution (see Private Eye, The Fall, George A. Romero), it's not quite the same with politics and commenting on it. I'd go so far to say that it's only in politics that quite so many otherwise dead subjects can be resurrected, whether because they never go away, or due to how they can be reanimated and gone over yet again, the same arguments rehashed and then ignored just as they were the last time.

So it is with Abu Qatada, the hirsute Islamic fanatic everyone loves to hate. It seems only last month that we were discussing why he should or shouldn't be deported for the umpteenth time, because it, err, was. It would be nice to think that the topic has been done to death: the government of whichever hue convinced of its righteousness in trying to deport him back to Jordan, with those few on the other side quietly pointing out that we could have avoided all this palaver had we attempted to put him on trial here in the first place, rather than sending him back into the welcoming arms of the authoritarian state he fled from. We did after all grant him asylum back in the care-free 90s, unconcerned as we were then of the phantom of exploding Muslims. Why, even those happy spooks in residence at Thames House believed they had him in their pocket, and that he wouldn't do anything to harm the state that had given him shelter.

Reacting though with weary resignation to Qatada's imminent release on "bail", if you can call a curfew of 22 hours bail, simply wouldn't suffice. We must instead go through the same cycle of outrage as last time, whether it's the Sun's take on the matter, with "evil Qatada sniggering at our humiliation and weakness", or the home secretary saying it "simply isn't acceptable" that he can't be deported, despite our diligence in attempting to ensure he won't be mistreated. It doesn't seem to matter that the danger from Qatada, such as it is, isn't that he will personally launch an attack: it's rather than he's provided theological guidance and motivation to jihadists in the past, and given the opportunity possibly will again. This makes the threat he poses under a 22 hour curfew, accompanied by surveillance, a tag and a ban on anyone visiting him who doesn't receive Home Office approval almost negligible. If anything he probably poses more of one where he currently is in HMP Long Lartin, where he can at least mix with the other detainees in the special immigration unit being held in similar circumstances to his (PDF), hardly improving the chances of any of the men having a change of heart over their extremist views.

It also doesn't matter that as Qatada's lawyer Gareth Pierce pointed out, he has been under both a control order and similar bail conditions previously, and on neither occasion was it found that he had breached those terms. He was taken back into custody the last time purely on the grounds of "national security reasons" which could not be disclosed, having embarrassed the government by shopping in broad daylight for kitchen roll and Diet Coke. Even if it turns out that the government can't reach agreement with Jordan over evidence potentially derived from torture being used against him, and the most likely outcome on that score seems to be Jordan dropping proceedings against him altogether, it hardly means he's going to be free to do whatever the hell he feels like: a TPIM, the coalition's replacement for control orders is only very slightly less rigorous.

There is a very obvious double standard at work here: regardless of what British citizens are accused of, we would refuse to send them to a country to face trial where the death penalty would definitively be sought should they be found guilty. Likewise, the outcry would be massive should the evidence they face be potentially tainted by or even be wholly the product of torture, as the ECHR has ruled in Qatada's case. You only have to look at the example of the Natwest Three, where a high profile and incredibly misleading PR campaign was launched on their behalf to see the difference when it's "our criminals" that are being sought. Despite all the scaremongering, they were back here within four years of their deportation. By comparison, and without being convicted of any crime here, Qatada was described today in parliament by the home secretary, however obliquely, as a terrorist.

As sympathetic as I am to the well articulated points of Michael White, who reasonably sets out why we have discharged our responsibilities to Qatada and indeed other non-citizens who attempt to avoid deportation to potential justice in a similar fashion, it remains the case that the whole venture has been doomed from the start. It's been a well established point of law for a long time now that you cannot deport someone back to a country where they will face the threat of mistreatment or a trial where the evidence is likely to be based on mistreatment; the House of Lords surprisingly overturned Qatada's successful court of appeal bid on that score, so it was always likely that his subsequent appeal to the European Court would succeed. Richard Norton-Taylor suggests that this whole course was supposedly chosen on the grounds that it would be easier than taking him through the courts, even though evidence of his extremist preaching, potentially amounting to inciting racial hatred, murder or terrorism is available.

Distasteful as it is that we should have dedicated such efforts and expense in protecting the rights of a man who would presumably like to see the imposition of Sharia law, this is exactly what makes us democracies. To steal wholesale from a comment posted by GuyStevenson on Eric Metcalfe's piece at the Graun, quoting
Aharon Barak, former head of the Supreme Court of Israel:

This is the destiny of democracy, as not all means are acceptable to it, and not all practices employed by its enemies are open before it. Although a democracy must often fight with one hand tied behind its back, it nonetheless has the upper hand. Preserving the Rule of Law and recognition of an individual's liberty constitutes an important component in its understanding of security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its spirit and its strength and allow it to overcome its difficulties.

It might save some time to remember this when we do have to put Qatada under that less strict regime. Except, of course, we won't.

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Wednesday, January 18, 2012 

Any inquiry would be better than no inquiry.

Despite the reaction of most human rights groups, the decision to abandon the Gibson inquiry into alleged British collusion in the torture of rendered detainees is not one to welcome wholeheartedly. Ostensibly for the reason that a new police investigation will now begin into the allegations made by two Libyan men that they were abandoned by ministers and the security services to the mercies of the Gaddafi regime, delaying further the already much postponed hearing of evidence, you also can't help but detect other reasons below the surface.

The Leveson inquiry is after all, in spite of initial misgivings, managing to swiftly get on with its work, getting around the problem of some would be key witnesses having been arrested by going through its remit in stages. One assumes that the inquiry is also being careful not to call those that the police could still decide are of interest to their investigation, although some who have been questioned by the police such as Neil Wallis and Neville Thurlbeck have still appeared and simply not been asked questions specifically on phone hacking. While it would have been more difficult for the Gibson inquiry to sidestep this potential problem quite so nimbly, as there are undoubtedly fewer important figures they would be interested in speaking to who wouldn't in some way be caught up in the new investigation, it seems bizarre how one inquiry can seemingly manage to do it and another can't. True, there is a major difference between the regulation of the media and the work of the security services, yet had there been the inclination these problems surely could have been surmounted.

The other challenge was the totally justified boycott of the inquiry both by the major human rights groups and by some of those who have claimed they were the victims of the policies of both the last government and the security services. These crucial witnesses were said to have met with the government on Monday in a last attempt to come to an agreement on their returning to the fold. With no deal apparently forthcoming, it's reasonable to assume that this is the real main reason Gibson has now been dumped. Intriguing then is that this has been so well received - Liberty in their statement even raise the possibility that this "delay" will mean we might actually get a "proper independent judicial inquiry". This leads to the assumption that even if there wasn't a deal reached on Monday, there was at least a promise that an inquiry would soon be held which would go some way towards meeting the demands of the likes of Liberty.

If this is the case, it has to be hoped that this promise is worth more than some of those made by previous governments concerning the security services. Despite Gibson's fundamentally flawed, purposefully crippled nature, such an inquiry would still be better than no inquiry. If it takes the police and then the CPS around the same amount of time to investigate the claims of Abdul Hakim Belhaj and Sami al-Saadi as it did to decide that Witness B and the others involved in Binyam Mohamed's case should not face charges, then it's likely to be another two years at least before the new inquiry can even begin to start its work. This will then additionally depend on just who the justice and foreign office ministers are at that point - there's no guarantee that there'll be as sympathetic as both Ken Clarke and Alistair Burt appear to be at the moment, Cameron continuing to keep his pre-election pledge or not. Even then it's hardly certain that the inquiry will be any less secret or more open than the Gibson one was going to be; the green paper on justice does little to inspire confidence that the security services won't lobby hard to keep their past handiwork almost completely in the shadows.

It will also mean it'll be nigh on a decade since much of the alleged collusion took place. Even if all the relevant documentation is made available, a very big if considering the problems that the Chilcot inquiry has had in that regard, the problem of failing memories can only combated when combined with exceptional detail, as the Saville inquiry into Bloody Sunday showcased. With even the report on the research conducted by the Gibson committee to be redacted, it's little wonder some are already suggesting that this may be a chance for truth lost forever. The longer it takes, the more likely those who authorised the collusion will get away it.

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Tuesday, January 17, 2012 

The man who knows too much.

There's something about Abu Qatada that truly terrifies the authorities in this country. Fast approaching the tenth anniversary of his initial arrest, he's spent the past decade either in Belmarsh, first under the notorious law introduced after 9/11 that allowed for the indefinite detention with charge of non-British citizens; at his home under a control order with a 14 or 22 hour curfew; and latterly, having been accused of trying to escape from this purgatory purely on the back of secret evidence which he couldn't challenge, held at Long Lartin. Unlike Babar Ahmed, who has now been held without charge awaiting deportation to America for the last 8 years and has had a high profile campaign calling for his trial in this country, hardly anyone has been prepared to speak up for the man also known as Omar Othman.

This is not exactly surprising. Having been described as Osama bin Laden's right-hand man in Europe by a Spanish judge, something noted at the beginning of almost every report on the latest legal movement in his case, and as a spiritual leader to al-Qaida when that detail is overlooked, you don't tend to receive much in the way of positive press. His case certainly isn't helped by his proximity to those other notorious Islamists, Abu Hamza and Abu Bakri Mohammed, nor by the speeches and lectures he gave which were favourites among those who went on to take part in terrorist attacks. His interview with Panorama back in 2001, reposted today, is deeply ambiguous and can be taken by both critics and those (very few) speaking in his defence as being either evidence of his general extremist views or his limiting of what is permissible under certain circumstances. Far easier to interpret is a supposed statement from him published on jihadist forums in 2009, where he makes reference to meeting Bilal Abdullah, convicted of the Glasgow airport and Tiger Tiger failed bomb attacks:

"Dr. Bilal Abdullah is a true man of Islam from all points of views; for he is knowledgeable, proficient, and resolute. I was humbled when I heard him say to me: "I was very influenced by your taped lectures.'"

The prison service for its part denied that Qatada was managing to smuggle out or issue any such communiques, although how reliable that claim is when there's a whole interview that was conducted with him also online is debatable.

Nonetheless, described by the reliable Will McCants as one of the most influential jihadi ideologues and having played a huge role in the development of contemporary takfirism, what is clear is that he was in the past an important figure to many involved in extremist Islam. Entirely opaque by contrast is his past involvement with the security services. Along with Abu Bakri, there is much debate about just how far his dealings went with MI5. Bakri has always claimed that he had a deal, described either as a covenant of security or a covenant of peace, whereby as long as he and his groupings did not advocate attacks in this country itself they would be left relatively alone. The only documentation we have which describes Qatada's interactions with MI5 is in the first ruling by SIAC (PDF), where the officer records in the second of his interviews with Qatada that "he came the closest he had to offering to assist me in any investigation of Islamic extremism", following it up by saying he would ‘report anyone damaging the interests of this country’. The officer came away from the third interview believing he had intimated that he "expected him to use that influence, wherever he could, to control the hotheads and ensure terrorism remained off the streets of London and throughout the United Kingdom". According to SIAC there were no further meetings.

This seems doubtful, especially when we consider the highly related cases of Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil el-Banna. Al-Rawi had become friends with Qatada, and following 9/11 agreed to help MI5 keep tabs on him. When Qatada went into hiding after the passing of the indefinite detention bill, al-Rawi was one of the few who knew where he was, and attempted to arrange a meeting between the two, Qatada pulling out at the last minute. His usefulness apparently over, MI5 said he could leave the country and go to Gambia, only for them to pass on fabricated material to the CIA saying they had taken bomb parts along on the journey. The result was their incarceration in Guantanamo Bay for 4 years.

At best then, it seems reasonable to believe Qatada has information which would highly embarrass MI5 should he have to be tried in the UK. At worst, he could be able to sing like the proverbial canary: if his meetings went far beyond what has so far been disclosed, it could well make the previous accusations of Londonistan look tame. As Richard Norton-Taylor also points out, and as was highlighted by the search for relevant documents following the bid for compensation by those who claimed they had been rendered to Guantanamo Bay with the connivance of MI5 and SIS, it will also be both extraordinarily expensive and time-consuming. Only last week it was announced that no one would face prosecution over their role in that policy. Avoiding a repeat of even the chance of that unpleasantness starting all over again, with all it involves for the reputation of the security services must be high on the list of priorities.

Moreover, it seems incredible considering the amount of material available that a prosecution couldn't be brought against Qatada here. The aforementioned SIAC ruling mentions that "he is reliably reported as having made a speech at a gathering in the Four Feathers Mosque in which he gave a blessing to the killing of Jews", the kind of incitement to racial hatred, or even incitement to murder which enabled the conviction of Abu Hamza. Ahmed Faraz was recently successfully prosecuted and jailed for selling books which included Sayid Qutb's Milestones, albeit apparently in a special edition "developed specifically to promote extremist ideology". If such a case can be made which could potentially affect both freedom of speech and freedom of the press, why can't one be made against the man many seem to believe was directly connected with al-Qaida? It seems to only be Qatada and the also loathsome, if not anywhere near as potentially dangerous Anjem Choudary who seem to be able to escape the law here.

This is the light in which today's ruling by the European Court of Human Rights that Qatada cannot be deported to Jordan has to be seen. While dismissing the notion that he would be liable to face torture, the court accepting the dubious promise of an authoritarian state that it will refrain from mistreating this one particular special prisoner, they upheld his claim that any trial would not be fair as the evidence against him would be overwhelmingly based on the confessions of two men, both of whom were tortured. Despite the disagreements of consecutive courts, Qatada having gone through the full process of SIAC to the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords to finally the ECHR, the government must have always known it was unlikely that he would ever be deported, whether on the worthlessness of the memorandum of understanding or as, it has turned out, under the right to a fair trial of Article 6.

What then do they do with Qatada now? Any further appeal seems liable to fail. The most obvious response from the government would be to put him under a TPim, the replacement for control orders, but this can hardly hold up in the courts indefinitely. Sooner or later, the authorities are going to have to face up to the fact that the person they fear knows much about their shady dealings is going to have to be prosecuted. They ought to start preparing for that rather than continuing to try desperately to do anything other than the decent and right thing.

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Friday, January 13, 2012 

The establishment has it all sown up.

It can't be said it's a surprise that no one at either MI5 or SIS will face charges over complicity in the torture of Binyam Mohamed. When the Crown Prosecution Service only decided after the Ian Tomlinson inquest that Simon Harwood should face manslaughter charges, having previously felt that a jury was unlikely to convict due to the inadequacy of the post-mortem performed by Freddy Patel, it was always unlikely that in an even more complex case, where the security services would doubtless make onerous demands over secrecy that any officers would come appear before the beak.

Even more politically toxic was the investigation made clear that front line officers were operating under guidelines which had been drawn up after consultation at the very highest levels of both the security services and government. Despite having pleaded ignorance at every turn, or completely ignored much of the questioning, it seems that ministers were the ones authorising just what agents could and couldn't do, as has been suggested by the documents that came to light in Libya.

With the horse having well and truly bolted, the government now of course wants to ensure that any such unpleasantness in the future can never emerge in the same way. With that sown up, and the laughable Gibson inquiry apparently stuck in limbo as more investigations unlikely to lead to a prosecution take place, the chance of anyone being held to account diminishes with each passing month.

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Wednesday, November 30, 2011 

More Clouseau than Smiley.

You can't exactly fault MI5 for having suspicions about Ekaterina Zatuliveter. Having seen the Americans flush out a whole batch of Russian "deep cover" agents (including Anna Chapman), so deep it seems that they barely did any spying at all, Zatuliveter must have seemed a no-brainer. She went to a university which according to MI5, the FSB has a "substantial" presence at. Beginning during this period, and continuing over the rest of the last decade, she had romances with a series of older men, all involved in either diplomacy, politics and lastly, in NATO. She worked for (and became the mistress of) an MP with a penchant for all things Russian, a man notorious for asking questions which could potentially be useful to them. Lastly, she met on a number of occasions someone known as "Boris", whom SIS claim was a Russian intelligence officer, although it seems she never took up invitations to meet him on a one-to-one basis.

Sadly for MI5, all this circumstantial evidence was simply unsubstantiated. In an extraordinary ruling (PDF), the Special Immigration Appeals Committee, with a former head of MI5 on the judging panel no less, has decided on the "balance of probabilities" that Zatuliveter was not and is not a Russian agent. Her decision to appeal against her removal from the UK on the grounds that her presence "was not conducive to the public good" was in itself perhaps a clue: not many spies once caught decide to fight to prove their innocence in a foreign nation when their duty is first and foremost to another state. It's also though a remarkable indictment of MI5, which it seems is still just as paranoid and stuck in the Cold War age as it ever was.

Take for instance the insistence of one witness from the security service that Zatuliveter's visit to see the Great Game, a play on Afghan culture and history was evidence of her spying, purely it seems on the basis that the name is taken from what Kipling described as the rivalry between Britain and Russia over the country. Or that Zatuliveter's diary, described so wonderfully as with a Klimt painting on the cover, was an incredibly elaborate fake. Indeed, even if it were genuine, it was their case that the entries did nothing to disprove their assessment of her as an agent. Siac agrees that it's a "very important document", in that the entries, first on the Dutch diplomat she was having a relationship with, and then later on Mike Hancock, are "of an immature, calculating, emotional and self-centred young woman – in our judgment, an
accurate characterization of the appellant then, and allowing for greater maturity, now".

According to MI5, Zatuliveter was tasked with seducing Hancock. If anything, it seems the opposite was the case. By chance, she came to be chaperoning the British delegation he was a part of when they visited St. Petersburg, whereupon it seems he broke out his old routine: inviting her for a coffee, then a meal, before finally asking whether she'd like to accompany him back to his hotel room, which she for now declined although they kept in contact. Although he offered her a traineeship at Strasbourg at this point, regardless of there not being a position available, it was only once she accepted his invitation to meet him in Moscow that she decided to "use" him to, as Siac quotes from her diary "to further her ambition to gain experience, at first hand, of Western European politics and, possibly, to get “a very good chance in life”. Regardless of her intentions, Siac are convinced both by the subsequent entries in the diary and from the witness statements of Zatuliveter's sister and her husband that the two genuinely fell in love, "however odd it might seem".

It wasn't until Zautuliveter received a place at Bradford University to do her masters that she first became Hancock's unpaid intern, although he also provided her with an allowance. The report and her diary both skirt around it, but it seems through the references to a "health problem" that he may well have made her pregnant. She later became Hancock's researcher when his previous one resigned, giving her full access, or as much as he ceded, to information which may have been of interest to the Russians. The curious case of "Boris" then commences: he met her by chance it seems at Temple tube station, where they exchanged business cards. He later emailed her to invite her to meet him. She agreed, only later to make what she described as a "lame" excuse, Hancock having told her not to go. Hancock himself confirms this, although Siac doesn't believe his explanation for why he told her not to. MI5 maintained that the fact he didn't renew this invitation is evidence she was already an agent, which seems counter-intuitive: why did he approach her in the first place, if he was who they say he is, unless he's thoroughly incompetent? Siac unsurprisingly concludes much the same.

Perhaps the entire case is explained by Zautuliveter's affair with Y, a NATO official working in Moscow, who she was introduced to at the Russian embassy. With her relationship with Hancock souring somewhat, she began swapping emails with him. Another piece of evidence MI5 relied upon was a exchange between the two while Zautuliveter was on a train, where she asked him if there was "anything interesting happening at NATO" and then whether "[Madeleine] Albright had said anything interesting". She explained this as being an attempt at showing off to him, and that she knew about Albright's meeting from Twitter, which again Siac accepts.

That, in essence, was MI5's entire miserable case. Zautuliveter repeatedly had relationships with older men in prominent positions, all of whom could provide information helpful to her home country, ergo she must have been doing it for that reason. Instead it simply seems she had a thing for older men, with whom she shared an interest in international politics, and in Hancock thought could help give her a better life, which he did. Yes, it was suspicious, but proper, rigorous investigation ought to have shown it was at best unlikely and at worst laughable. Siac for their part, perhaps prodded somewhat by Lander, rejects the similar criticisms made by Zautuliveter's lawyer. They also accept wholeheartedly that in her position as Hancock's researcher she had access to material which would have been interesting to the Russians, which seems dubious in itself, although the history of security services worldwide is full of inconsequential men and women who spied and never provided anything of real worth to their handlers.

All of which raises the obvious question: if MI5 can get something this wrong, who else has been wrongly accused, or where else are they failing? Or is this simply a consequence of the lack of resources being devoted to espionage as opposed to counter-terrorism? It's a case that is crying out for an investigation by an independent body, something which will most certainly not be provided by the hopelessly ineffective Intelligence and Security Committee.

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Wednesday, October 19, 2011 

Slamming the door shut.

It was a long time ago now, but back in the mists of time (around 2002 if we must be specific) former spooks were rather complimentary about, err, Spooks. Not because of its realism, obviously, as in only the second episode one of the agents was dipped in a deep fat fryer, but more for showing the security services in a highly flattering light. After all, the real services had long been associated in the public imagination if at all by the grey men now also back on our screens in the form of George Smiley, or alternatively by Harold Wilson as the kind of paranoid lunatics who wanted to know where members of the public had bought subversive literature such as the Daily Mirror from. Here instead were young, dynamic attractive self-sacrificing individuals with consciences, even if they did manage to save the world every week all but single-handedly.

Strangely, they're now rather more sniffy about it as the show reaches its climax. This is especially curious as the series as it's continued through the seasons has stayed more or less the same: almost everyone working for MI5 is a saintly lefty, head honcho Harry especially, most recently denouncing oligarchs profiting from earthquakes while still protecting them from murderous anarchists. Yes, he took part in unpleasantness during the Cold War era, but so did everyone. In the current age of rendition and torture, MI5 is spotless; it's everyone else that's dirty, whether it's the CIA, Mossad or the Russians, and they're all out to deceive, even directly target the plucky Brits desperately trying to do the right thing.

Perhaps it's the fact this is such an inversion of reality that so winds up those formerly in the service. There certainly wouldn't be any need for the Gibson inquiry if MI5 and 6, admittedly with the full support of the last government, hadn't at the very least connived in the mistreatment and deportation of "terrorist suspects" to various hellholes across the globe. Incredibly distressing for them and the government was that these ingrates, having been graciously allowed to return to this beacon of human rights and open justice, were now demanding to see the documentation which consigned them there in the first place. Having fought tooth and nail to prevent the "seven paragraphs" from being released, under the ostensible reason that to do so would breach the "control" principle, whereby the foreign intelligence service that provided the information in the first place has full control over what happens to it afterwards, even though an American court had already put far more damning information concerning the torture of Binyam Mohamed into the public domain, this was a far worse threat. Annoying the Americans slightly is one thing, but allowing massive amounts of highly incriminating information, likely to be read completely out of context, to become public was simply unconscionable.

The government green paper published today, titled Justice and Security, is the long in coming attempt to slam the door towards something resembling transparency shut forever. Having rejected the orthodox consensus on responding to scandal that involves complete openness (or as much openness as can be reasonably expected from organisations which must work in secret) about what went wrong so that the mistakes can be learned from, with the Gibson inquiry neutered and the interested parties boycotting it as a result, it's no surprise that it recommends an expansion of the special advocate system already in place for the soon to be abolished control order system and used in the special immigration appeals process. Yes, the thoroughly unsatisfactory system where someone on a control order can't even know what it is exactly they're accused of doing is thought to be good enough to put in place when someone alleging wrongdoing seeks redress through the courts. While no one has suggested that the advocates are patsies and seem to have performed at least a decent job so far, that the claimants themselves cannot have personal access to material concerning them, or indeed, concerning their mistreatment is about as far from open justice as it is possible to imagine.

Equally, no one is suggesting that this isn't a highly difficult area. The supreme court when considering the appeal from the government against the ruling for the freed Guantanamo men agonised over it, before concluding that this was an area where justice must be seen to be done but which parliament should have the final say on. If this is going to happen, then we should be damn sure that such abuses aren't going to happen again in the future. Rather than take the calls for truly independent oversight into the security services seriously, all the green paper proposes is a derisory, ever so slight reform of the intelligence and security committee, the same parliamentary committee that produced the now even more laughable than it was then report on rendition. All it suggests is making it a statutory committee of parliament, as well as beefing up their power to demand material from the security services, who even then will still be able to persuade the security of state to veto any especially onerous requests. It does consult on the possibility of introducing an inspector-general, a layer of oversight used in other countries, but it seems the least likely option rather than the most.

Despite all the fantastic investigative journalism produced by numerous journalists that exposed first the rendition program and then British complicity in it, it was the Binyam Mohamed court case that meant an official inquiry, no matter how crippled, had to be established. Without the release of those seven paragraphs the legal action and settlement would not have followed. Under these proposals it's clear that such information would not in the future become public. This is perfect for organisations desperate for everyone to focus on the unmitigated good they do, and their tireless work to protect us from the few out there who wish us harm, but an injustice when they get things so terribly wrong. As the Guardian argues, none of this would have been necessary had MI5 and 6 not followed the CIA down the road to hell. Cover-ups in turn only make suspicions and grievances worse. A path needs to be found whereby justice must be seen to be done, with those seeking redress able to access the information held on them, while still protecting national security. The proposed system is as much a mockery of the values the services pledge to uphold as Spooks is of the deeply boring, conflicted and overall thoroughly human men and women trying to keep us safe.

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Monday, September 05, 2011 

Don't worry, Peter Gibson will get to the bottom of it.

Well, at least we now know why Moussa Koussa was allowed to leave our septic isle so swiftly. When he arrived here at the end of the March having defected from Gaddafi's regime, one of the few things that he wasn't accused of was of a long-term convivial relationship with MI6, let alone being on such friendly terms with the secret intelligence service that it appears he and Sir Mark Allen were the equivalent of best mates. It would have always been bad form to encourage someone to defect only then to charge them with some sort of offence once they arrived; it's now apparent there was never any chance of something like that happening, despite our glorious coalition intimating that all options were open. Koussa, interestingly, left for Qatar, one of the few Arab nations to provide direct military assistance to the rebels, more than suggesting he has friends in high places there also.

The collapse of dictatorships will naturally mean a certain amount of unpleasantness for those overseas both in government and business who set aside any qualms they had about human rights to deal with such nations, but they can always reassure themselves with the knowledge that they did so only to indirectly help the poor people trapped under totalitarian regimes. That's clearly the only thing Sir Mark Allen had in mind when he went in one hop from head of counter-terrorism at MI6, resigning after he was overlooked for the top job, to special adviser at BP, who subsequently signed a massive oil exploration deal with Libya. MI6 had after all played a major role in successfully persuading Gaddafi to abandon his WMD programmes; as the Iraq war has taught us, only countries without such material get bombed or invaded. Such victories requiring mutual understanding, respect, and sharing of intelligence.

It's hardly a surprise then to learn that both the CIA and MI6 quickly became bosom buddies with the self-same individuals who previously had been among their chief antagonists. We already knew that the CIA especially had been co-operating most assiduously with their counterparts in Libya, having allowed one of their previously most prized detainees, Ibn Sheikh al-Libi, to return to his native land, where he sadly "committed suicide" in the notorious Abu Salim prison two years ago. Neither is it really earth-shattering that MI6 were happy to assist in the rendition of Abu Munthir, former deputy emir of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, from Hong Kong. Allegiances in the world of intelligence shift by the day: that, according to David Shayler (when he was credible, it should be stressed), MI6 had funded the group's attempt to assassinate Gaddafi in the 90s only to later turn over some of those it must have had contact with is just the way these things go.

Much more shocking are the allegations that the Libyans were being provided with details of the activities of dissidents in this country, with all the potential implications that has for any relatives back home. Much was being made earlier in the year of how those taking part in demonstrations against the crackdown in Syria were being photographed by diplomats, with their families coming under pressure from the regime as a result. It's one thing for a regime's overseas intelligence agency to keep tabs on dissidents; it's quite another for their host country to do it for them. What's more, it breaches the very code, not to mention law which our security services keep insisting they have consistently abided by: Sir John Sawers said last year that if they believed action taken by themselves will lead to torture they would not do so, even if it meant terrorist activity would take place as a result. That certainly doesn't seem to have impeded the passing of such information in this instance.

We can of course only guess at what would be uncovered if our intelligence archives were opened up in their entirety in a similar manner, and not just provided to establishment historians to give clean bills of health to (surely to independent academics who have reached entirely appropriate conclusions based on the evidence before them? Ed.). In any case, we have the next best thing: the Gibson inquiry.

Oh.

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Friday, September 02, 2011 

Eliza Manningham-Bullshitter speech shock.

"I was actually against everything I did while I was head of MI5. Shame I didn't do something about it then."

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Thursday, August 04, 2011 

The comforting recourse to the black pen of the censor.

One of the odd afflictions of both those who comment on politics and those who actually conduct it is that whenever a scandal erupts, a minister is accused of some impropriety or a policy ends in disaster we demand an inquiry. This isn't because either of the two groups have any great faith in the inquiry getting to the bottom of what actually happened - it's a very rare occasion when the findings are so damning that almost everyone has to acknowledge them - it's because neither know what else to do other than ask some independent grandee to investigate. Strangely though, this initial cynicism and scepticism is often forgotten once the report is published and the conclusion fails to satisfy.

The other thing to keep in mind is that while governments find it very easy to conduct investigations into those other than themselves, hence why the inquiries into phone hacking at the News of the World and associated matters have now become so wide-ranging that one suspects we won't see the results until just before the next election, they do their very best to scupper or hinder those into matters which they don't really want to talk about. This backfired on the Blair government, meaning that rather than one investigation into the Iraq war we're now waiting on the fourth.

History seems unlikely to repeat itself when it comes to the coalition's purposely crippled inquiry into the security services' alleged collusion in torture. After a year of trying to make the government see sense, the 10 involved NGOs, including Liberty, Amnesty and Human Rights Watch amongst others have withdrawn their cooperation from the Peter Gibson helmed inquiry. From the very beginning it seemed unlikely to meet even the smell test: Gibson was already the intelligence services commissioner, a position you aren't offered if there's even the slightest fear you might be anything other than slavishly establishment. A truly independent figure not associated with the intelligence services would have been the obvious choice if the new government really wanted to ensure any mistakes committed under Labour aren't repeated.

Instead it seems Gibson's powers will largely resemble those already wielded by the discredited and supine Intelligence and Security Committee, the toothless parliamentary panel which whitewashed rendition and was almost certainly lied to by a former head of MI5. He cannot order any particular witness to submit to appearing before the inquiry, nor can he demand to see all the evidence the security services hold on rendition. It's instead up to MI5/6 what they decide to graciously provide. Those who claim to have been mistreated will also go unrepresented, with their lawyers unable to question any witnesses. Moreover, the end report, like with those produced by the ISC, will go before the prime minister and the cabinet secretary before it's released, with both able to demand redactions. For an insight into what it will probably end up looking like, you can take a glance at Sir Richard Dearlove's evidence to the Chilcot inquiry, so heavily censored that you wonder why they bothered releasing it at all.

Why they continue to be quite so wedded to such tight secrecy when so much of what they're likely to go over is public knowledge is made clear by the Guardian obtaining the official security service policy document on dealing with foreign intelligence agencies over detainees of interest. In itself it makes clear that despite their insistence they knew nothing of how the United States was mistreating detainees until the Abu Ghraib scandal, MI5/6 had already developed a strategy at the beginning of 2002 in an attempt to remain above the depths the US was sinking to. As it sets out, where they were concerned there was a clear chance of being complicit in torture, they could still go ahead as long as there was approval from the highest levels, right up to that of ministers. It even admits that disclosure of such collusion could in itself lead to further radicalisation of those they were meant to be monitoring and preventing from launching attacks, or damage the reputation of the agencies, yet such worries were pushed to the side.

Apart from pointing the finger directly at ministers who at the time repeatedly denied any knowledge of rendition in particular, Jack Straw notably denouncing such claims as "conspiracy theories", it gives a taster of both what a proper inquiry could uncover and how the door is now being slammed shut. As Malcolm Rifkind has taken to the airwaves to say, there are simply some things so sensitive and so secret that us poor plebs can never know about them, especially it seems if it involves collusion in the mistreatment of our own citizens and residents. It doesn't matter that as they themselves predicted, the reputation of MI5/6 has been damaged by the allegations, and that the only way to repair a sullied reputation is as near to complete disclosure as can be provided by what have to remain semi-secret organisations, the default response remains stonewalling, backed up by those armed with the black pen of the censor.

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Thursday, February 24, 2011 

A uniquely British security fudge.

The last week has seen another of those uniquely British security fudges played out in the Royal Courts of Justice. Having never managed to obtain the full independent inquiry into the 7/7 bombings long campaigned for and demanded by the majority of the relatives of those killed by the four suicide bombers, the equally long in coming inquest into the 56 deaths that day has had to serve in its place. With the evidence of how the day unfolded now finished, attention has turned to the long crucial questions: just how much did MI5 really know about the four bombers, and was there anything they could have done if not to stop the bombings, then at least to have identified the men beforehand?

As could have been expected from our intelligence services, so utterly wedded to operating in the shadows, they've from the very outset attempted to provide as little actual information and evidence to the coroner as they conceivably could, legally challenging Lady Justice Hallett's every decision, and thankfully have also lost on nearly every attempt. The evidence given this week by someone who can only be identified as Witness G, the chief of staff to Jonathan Evans, the head of MI5, is the product of these battles and eventual compromise. From originally having only been prepared to appear in a closed session, where only the coroner, the lawyers and the clerks of the court would be allowed to sit, MI5 was eventually forced into accepting that the families would also be allowed to see Witness G giving evidence, the coroner accepting the validity of what she termed their "whites of their eyes" argument (PDF). The media were however excluded, not apparently to be trusted with seeing a member of the security services and not blabbing about what he looked like. Considering how often they're briefed by "senior intelligence sources", this seems ever so slightly ridiculous.

Then again, much of what the security services have tried to avoid doing has been ridiculous. it hasn't been explained properly for instance why all of the above could not have been avoided entirely, by Jonathan Evans himself giving evidence. He was after all deputy director general of the service at the time of the bombings, and had previously been the most senior officer involved in international counter-terrorism. Him appearing for MI5 would have showed the organisation to be fully accountable, as say the CIA is in America, where George Tenet testified in public before the 9/11 commission, and entirely removed the need for anonymity orders, as well as any additional risk to Witness G, the claimed reason for why he couldn't appear publicly. Presumably one argument being made against would be that it would be obvious as to where such a potentially high profile target for an attack would be for a whole week, although this hardly stops the prime minister for instance from residing in what is hardly the most secure building, or indeed from walking along Whitehall with only a couple of bodyguards. Just like Evans and his predecessor have refused to appear before parliamentary human rights committees, so it seems the only public space they're willing to occupy despite their identities no longer being secret is the lecterns they give the occasional speech from.

If the inquest up till now has provided the opportunity for catharsis for all those involved either directly or indirectly on that terrible day, then it's doubtful whether Witness G's evidence will ultimately provide the closure that the relatives and survivors seek. The expression of regret for not preventing the attack was expected, although whether it really is "nonsensical and offensive" to suggest that they could have prevented an attack they had long warned would eventually come is far more dubious. Very little has been disclosed or explained in more detail than when we first learned that despite originally claiming the bombers were "clean-skins", Mohammad Siddique Khan for one had been on the periphery of counter-terrorism investigations since 2001 without ever being named. Certainly, there hasn't been anything approaching a properly adequate explanation as to why certain leads weren't followed up which can't be simply all put down to lack of resources or because they were deemed to only be involved in funding related fraud: it has long seemed extraordinary that despite MI5 following Khan and Shezhad Tanweer up the M1 after they had met with Omar Khyam, the ringleader of the fertilizer bomb plot, and taking the photograph that would be later appallingly cropped and greyscaled that they were never positively identified.

The clarity of the photograph of the two bombers is one of the few new submissions to come out of the inquest. Back in 2007 MI5 claimed that the quality was "very poor", only for the more than decent colour version to now emerge. Witness G's explanation as to why the copy forwarded to the US for supergrass Mohammed Junaid Babar to peruse was edited was unconvincing to say the least: it could have been altered to conceal the circumstances in which it was taken. To take a wild guess it looks like the product of a concealed pinhole lens, certainly something the FBI will have. In any case, expecting someone to make a identification based on such a poor copy as that sent across was optimism epitomised, or alternatively just going through the motions, which might just explain why such a poor job was made of cropping it. When in doubt, the ultimate excuse has been resorted to: Witness G couldn't provide the full details on why a significant lead in March 2005 wasn't followed up without affecting "national security". Quite how national security would be significantly damaged 6 years on by explaining in full why it wasn't followed up is anyone's guess; surely investigations aren't still continuing with links going back that far, and it seems unlikely the source(s) could be identified by doing so considering the amount of time that has passed.

Whether the families will ultimately be convinced by Witness G's final assertion that even if the leads had been followed up, there was no realistic prospect of the plot being uncovered remains to be seen. Even the most ardent critics of the security services, myself included, accept that it is impossible for every attack to be foiled, and that they are often between the proverbial rock and a hard place: assaulted for scaremongering and then also for failing when they do make mistakes. The ultimate test is whether the equally clichéd lessons have been learned, and while MI5's resources, links with police forces and capability to follow up leads have all been improved and upgraded, where they continue to fall down is in accountability and openness, as the inquest has so acutely identified. As they obviously have no interest in reforming themselves in this regard, it has to be up to the government to force them. All the signs are that this will be yet another subject the coalition will flunk.

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Friday, October 29, 2010 

Stepping out of the shadows while wanting to remain in the dark.

One of the glorious things about the British state has always been the notion that the hoi polloi should be eternally grateful when our social betters deign to either visit or talk to us. For the most part this has thankfully broken down, both due to the fracturing somewhat of the class structure and the shattering of the notion of deference. The only real times such attitudes still apply are when it comes to the senior royals, and even more bizarrely, when our intelligence chiefs briefly step out of the shadows to inform us all of just how deeply moral and ethical they are, saving countless lives and foiling the dastardly plans of the evil minority amongst us. We should be privileged, it seems, that they take time out of their schedules of saving the world from impending doom to lecture us on how deeply unfair it is that anyone dares to second guess what they do.

The reality is that such speeches never take place in a vacuum. When Eliza Manningham-Buller whilst still head of MI5 briefly entered the limelight she told of us of how they were monitoring up to 30 active plots, with there being around 1,600 individuals of interest to them who wished us ill. It is doubtless down to the sacrifices of MI5 that of those 30 plots causing active concern, and those 2,000 individuals dedicated to thinking up new and imaginative ways to kill us that there has not been a successful terrorist attack here since 7/7. Then again, perhaps not: figures released yesterday made clear that over the last two years, no one has been held for longer than 14 days without charge under anti-terrorist legislation. Either the terrorist threat has been consistently over-egged, to say the least, or MI5, MI6, the police and everyone else is doing a fantastic job keeping us safe from harm.

Yesterday Sir John Sawers, the current "C", or for those of us who've never much liked James Bond, the head of the Secret Intelligence Service, delivered a speech which was, and this was highlighted by everyone so we must also do so, televised live. His aim in doing so was to answer two questions, the second of which was presumably the whole point of his turning up. In the light of the completely untrue allegations made against the security services by those whose innocence has never been proved, how can the public have confidence that work done in secret is lawful, ethical, and in their interests?

It's a tricky one, isn't it? Sir John thankfully had the answer: because he said it is. In fact, it was even better than that, as his speech itself makes clear:

Suppose we receive credible intelligence that might save lives, here or abroad. We have a professional and moral duty to act on it. We will normally want to share it with those who can save those lives.

We also have a duty to do what we can to ensure that a partner service will respect human rights. That is not always straightforward.

Yet if we hold back, and don't pass that intelligence, out of concern that a suspect terrorist may be badly treated, innocent lives may be lost that we could have saved.

These are not abstract questions for philosophy courses or searching editorials. They are real, constant, operational dilemmas.

Sometimes there is no clear way forward. The more finely-balanced judgments have to be made by Ministers themselves. I welcome the publication of the consolidated guidance on detainee issues. It reflects the detailed guidance issued to SIS staff in the field and the training we give them.

Torture is illegal and abhorrent under any circumstances, and we have nothing whatsoever to do with it. If we know or believe action by us will lead to torture taking place, we're required by UK and international law to avoid that action. And we do, even though that allows the terrorist activity to go ahead.


It is really rather gobsmacking: here is the head of our foreign intelligence service first putting forward the hoary old chestnut that is the "ticking time bomb scenario", where the human rights of the suspect conflict with the opportunity to save lives, then immediately afterwards stating categorically that torture is illegal and abhorrent and that they have nothing to do with it. It's not difficult to see the conflict between these two statements, as Craig Murray most definitely has. We're back it seems to plausible deniability - putting the argument plainly and strongly for exactly the sort of abuse which has been documented post 9/11 - then stating equally plainly and strongly that they would never ever do such a thing.

If for some unfathomable reason you don't trust the word of MI6, then well, you're pretty much stuffed. For Sir John is firmly in favour of the "control principle", where by you don't release information you've received from others without their permission. This was supposedly breached when the "seven paragraphs" concerning the mistreatment of Binyam Mohamed were ordered to be published by the Court of Appeal. It doesn't matter to MI6 that the main reason for doing so was that a legal ruling in the US had already established beyond doubt that Mohamed was tortured, using information from the CIA; the principle rather than shining the light of truth on such "abhorrent" practices by our closest allies is far more important. Sawers looks forward to a green paper which will set out "some better options for dealing with national security issues in the courts", for which it's impossible to read anything other than an end to courageous judges exposing what was done in our name.

Although it reflects a Blackadder joke, Sir John Sawers is right in saying secrecy is not a dirty word. We need intelligence services, as is demonstrated by the packages which have been intercepted on cargo planes today. Openness it seems however is a dirty word. Sawers can talk all he wants about the useless Intelligence and Security Committee and two former judges who act as commissioners; their work simply doesn't provide anywhere near enough oversight into services which routinely do perform heroics, but which can equally also find themselves complicit in activity which makes us less safe, not more. What is needed is a wholly independent body, similar to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, which would conduct yearly reviews and also have the powers to investigate allegations of abuse, producing reports which would be as lightly censored as possible. For all their recognition that they can no longer hide in the shadows, the intelligence services still want to remain in the dark, and are actively fighting to do so.

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